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On August 15, 1971, Richard Nixon imposed the first and only peacetime wage 
and price controls in U.S. history.   The Nixon tapes, personal tape recordings made 
during the presidency of Richard Nixon, are now available to the public and provide a 
unique body of evidence to investigate the motivations for Nixon’s macroeconomic 
policies.  We have uncovered and report in this paper evidence that Nixon manipulated 
both monetary and fiscal policies to create a political business cycle that helped secure 
his reelection victory in 1972.   Nixon was very knowledgeable about economic matters 
and understood the risks to the economy of his macroeconomic policy actions and the 
imposition of wage and price controls, but chose to tradeoff longer-term economic costs 
to the economy for his own short-term political gain. 
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Introduction. 
 
Over thirty-years ago, William Nordhaus (1975) initiated the literature on the 
opportunistic political business cycle, the idea that politicians regardless of their party 
affiliation try to maximize their chances for reelection by creating favorable economic 
environments in the run-up to elections.  If operative, the opportunistic political business 
cycle should yield economic fluctuations that follow the election cycle.  Nordhaus’ work 
has spawned hundreds of papers, but support for his hypothesis has been far from 
unanimous.  Alesina, et al. (1997), for example, report that the opportunistic model does 
poorly in explaining economic fluctuations in many countries.   More recent work points 
to party-specific evidence for political business cycles (for example, Kraus and Mendez 
(2005) and Bloomberg and Hess (2003)). 
The Nixon tapes, personal tape recordings made during the presidency of Richard 
Nixon, are now available to the public and provide unique evidence to investigate the 
existence of an opportunistic political business cycle.  We have uncovered and report in 
this paper evidence that Nixon manipulated both monetary and fiscal policies to create a 
political business cycle that helped secure his reelection victory in 1972.  
 
Nixon’s New Economic Policy.    
On August 15, 1971, President Richard Nixon, a self-proclaimed Republican 
“Conservative,”
1  announced the first and only peacetime program of wage and price 
controls in U.S. history.  The wage and price control program was part of Nixon’s New 
Economic Policy (NEP), a set of fiscal and regulatory actions designed to take aim at the 
                                                 
1 Nixon tape conversation No. 607-11.   5 
problems of unemployment, inflation and international currency speculation.
2  The NEP 
called for the suspension of the convertibility of the dollar into gold, a temporary tariff 
surcharge of 10 percent on all imports, a tax credit for investing in new equipment, the 
repeal of a 7 percent excise tax on automobiles and an accelerated schedule for increasing 
personal-income-tax exemptions.   In addition to these expansionary fiscal policies, the 
president was simultaneously working to ensure that monetary policy would become 
increasingly expansionary (Abrams, 2006). 
Table 1 provides background data on unemployment and inflation leading up to 
NEP.  Over the previous two years, the unemployment rate had risen steadily, increasing 
from 3.5% to 6%.  While the inflation rate moderated somewhat over the two-year 
period, it remained at 4.4% for the twelve months ending July 1, 1971.  Phase I of the 
wage and price control program, initiated on August 15, froze wages and prices for 90 
days.  In November, Phase II was launched empowering a Pay Board and a Price 
Commission with authority to approve wage and price increases.  The President 
confidently predicted that continued support for his economic program would cut the 
inflation rate in half.
3  Nixon proved to be a very poor economic forecaster.  During the 
next four years, 1972-1975, the inflation rate surged to an average annual rate of 8 
percent. 
The NEP, in conjunction with the highly expansionary monetary policy, produced 
the expected increase in aggregate demand and output that was needed to reduce 
unemployment.  During 1972, real output increased by 7.7% and the unemployment rate 
dropped from 5.9% to finish the year at 5.2%.   In such a stimulated economy, did the 
                                                 
2 Transcript of Presidential address, New York Times, August 16, 1971, p. 14 
3 Television News Archive, Vanderbilt University, CBS Evening News for Monday, November 15, 1971.   6 
President and his policymakers believe that temporary wage and price controls would be 
sufficient to tame inflation?  Or were the decisions to impose wage and price controls 
made for purely short-run political gain?   
Herbert Stein, a member of the Council of Economic Advisors in August, 1971, 
recalls the rationale used by some in the Administration to justify the price and wage 
controls:  “The theory was that the inflation then underway (about 4% per year) was 
propelled by expectations of inflation, not by underlying demand and supply conditions.  
The 90-day freeze would shake those expectations, and then the economy would subside 
into price stability.”
4  Thus, one possible line of thinking was that the aggregate demand 
stimulation would take care of the unemployment problem and the temporary wage and 
price controls would take care of the inflation problem.
5 
An alternative justification for temporary wage and price controls relies on 
opportunistic political behavior.  At the time of the wage and price freeze, Richard 
Nixon’s presidential re-election bid was less than fifteen months away.  Any political 
gains that might be made in the run up to the election from reducing unemployment 
might be negated if the inflation rate accelerated.  Temporary wage and price controls 
would conveniently disguise inflation until after the election.    
Were temporary wage and price controls implemented and maintained in the run-
up to the election to break inflationary expectations or were they the product of political 
opportunism?      In what follows, we report on relevant conversations that provide an 
answer to this question. 
 
                                                 
4 Stein, “Wage and Price Controls: 25 Years Later,” http://msjc.edu/econ/dpynn/article081902.htm  
5 Incredibly, Stein goes on to write:  “It was a rather flaky theory, and we were not prepared for the 
possibility that it was wrong.”   7 
PRE-FREEZE CONVERSATIONS. 
 
February 19, 1971  (Conversation Number  452  – 4 )  Nixon with a group of ten 
economists including Office of Management and Budget Director George Shultz and  
Council of Economic Advisors Chairman Paul McCracken. 
  Nixon notes that he worked in the Office of Price Administration in 1942 and that 
“…In my view… wage-price controls in peacetime on a broad basis will not work…If I 
thought they would not lead to a terrible smothering to enter on this whole free economy 
of ours, hell I’d be for it.”   
February 19, 1971 (454 – 4)   Nixon, Treasury Secretary John  Connally, Federal 
Reserve Board Chairman Arthur Burns, Shultz and  McCracken. 
Burns: “In my view the monetary authority… has laid the foundation for recovery. … 
What is holding back the economy now is not any shortage of money but a certain 
shortage of confidence.  If we flooded the banks even more than we have I think you 
could have awful problems in 1972 and beyond.” 
  Burns is against engaging in a more expansionary monetary policy.  At the end of 
this meeting, Connally asks about an Administration position on wage and price controls 
and suggests his support.  At the time, Congress was considering a bill to extend the 
President’s authority to impose controls for another two years which was subsequently 
approved.   
Connally:  “What position do you want us to take?  …  We ought to have a position. …  
We ought not to be in a position of not wanting to use it.” 
Nixon:  “We have no intention of applying them at this time.”   8 
February 22, 1971 (455 – 3)  Nixon, Counsel to the President John Ehrlichman and 
White House Press Secretary Ron Ziegler.  Shultz, Special Counsel to the President 
Charles Colson and Labor Secretary James Hodgson join at various times.  Some 
leave at various times. 
Nixon:    “On this wage price freeze, Jim [addressing Hodgson] I’m not about to do a 
damn thing.  … Davis-Bacon appeals to me more than a freeze.” 
  Nixon hopes that suspension of the Davis-Bacon Act requiring all workers under 
federal contracts to receive comparable union wages would send a message to labor and 
break the wage spiral.  Hodgson replies that suspension of Davis-Bacon would be viewed 
as anti-union and would not stop wage increases. 
Nixon: “Here’s my concern about the freeze…There is strong support for a wage board 
and wage-price controls and particularly from sources like Arthur Burns. …  The 
difficulty with wage-price controls and a wage board as you well know is that the God 
damned things will not work.  They didn’t work even at the end of World War II.  They 
will never work in peacetime.” 
  Later, 
Nixon:  “Burns is not playing our game. … Burns used to be against controls. … He 
always was… up to 1968. … Now he says he’s for a wage-price board. … [He knows]… 
I’m not going to have wage and price controls.” 
February 22, 1971 (455 – 22)  Nixon, Shultz, and Ehrlichman. 
  The conversation focuses on controls, a freeze and suspension of Davis-Bacon. 
Nixon: “I know the reasons, you do it [wage and price controls] for cosmetic reasons 
good God! But this is too early for cosmetic reasons.”   9 
  Nixon doesn’t believe that controls will work, but is now apparently willing to do 
something “cosmetic” that would help his re-election.  A freeze or controls likely would 
be effective for only a short period of time and thus, if imposed, Nixon thinks they should 
be imposed close to the 1972 election. 
  Later Nixon and Shultz discuss Connally’s upcoming testimony.  They discuss 
Burns’ recommendation for a Wage Stabilization Board.  Nixon tells Shultz to convey the 
following to Connally regarding Burns’ recommendation: 
Nixon:  “If he’s [Connally] asked about that [wage and price controls], I think he should 
sink it.  Give it the same disdain that Arthur gives everything we suggest.” 
  Burns, up to this point, has been fighting Nixon’s attempts to pressure him into 
adopting a more expansionary monetary policy.  Nixon, still opposed to controls, uses 
Burns’ support for wage and price controls to further paint him as the enemy.  In a 
subsequent conversation, Nixon rants against Jews in government, including Burns, and 
believes Burns is a primary source of leaks of confidential information.  In Nixon’s mind, 
Burns now has more than three strikes against him. 
March 5, 1971 (462 – 13) Quadriad
6 meeting with Nixon, Burns, Shultz, Connally 
and McCracken. 
  Nixon notes that inconsistent statements from Administration officials decrease 
the public’s confidence in the Administration.  Burns  comes  to  the defense of 
McCracken’s recent statements about unemployment, but Nixon expresses no sympathy. 
Burns:  “Paul McCracken has to interpret these figures [the unemployment rate] as an 
economist or he will lose credibility even next month.” 
                                                 
6 The Quadriad comprised Nixon’s four chief economic advisors.   10 
Nixon: “You say credibility with the press. First let us remember the press [garbled], the 
great majority couldn’t give one stinking damn about whether we’re credible or not. They 
just want us to lose.” 
  Burns seems stung by Nixon’s criticism and later Nixon flatters Burns.    Later, 
Connally suggests that monetary policy should be used to lower interest rates.   
Connally: “We need to drive this interest rate down.” 
Burns: “…..We could make matters worse by making money easier…..If anybody gets 
the notion, you see, that we are easing monetary policy further, that will intensify these 
fears of a rise in interest rates later on.” 
  Burns clearly indicates his knowledge that expansionary monetary policy is likely 
to raise inflationary expectations and interest rates.  At the end of the meeting, the others 
leave and Connally stays to talk with Nixon.  Nixon praises Connally for stressing the 
need to lower interest rates.   
 
March 5, 1971 (462 – 15) Nixon, Haldeman and Connally.   
Nixon:   “He’s [Burns is] ruthless.  He plays all the bureaucracy.  He plays all the press.  
He does the leaks.  He does everything else, John.” 
Connally:   “He plays that Hill … in a big way.  Both sides.” 
Nixon:   “I’d be delighted to be the first President in 25 years to take the Fed on if it 
becomes necessary.” 
Connally:   “He can force these interest rates down and that ought to be done.” 
  Neither Connally nor Nixon is an economist, but they know the monetary policy 
appropriate for their political objective.   11 
March 11, 1971  (466 – 2)  Nixon and Connally.   
Nixon:  “Whenever you have anything to talk about, as you know … [Secretary of State 
Willim P.]  Rogers can get through; [Defense Secretary Melvin R.] Laird can get through; 
[Attorney General John N.] Mitchell can and you can, that’s all.” 
  In less than one month, Connally has become one of the President’s closest 
advisors. 
March 16, 1971  (468 – 15)  Nixon and Connally.  
  Nixon and Connally discuss Burns.  Connally indicates his intention to tell Burns 
that he is getting into Connally’s territory.  Burns should stay out of wage-price controls 
and fiscal policy, even if he is knowledgeable about it.  
  Later, 
Nixon: “…he is also wrong in terms of monetary supply, damn it!  Everybody except 
Arthur thinks it ought to be higher [money supply] and let’s just keep hitting him on 
that…..He [Burns] must not do things that are going to embarrass the Administration.” 
  Nixon would have done well to heed his own advice.  
March 18, 1971 (469 – 9)  Nixon and Connally.  
  Connally reports to the President about his meeting with Burns and that he 
delivered the message to Burns that he is losing his influence. 
Connally:  [recalling what he told Burns] “ ‘If I read the tea leaves right … you  are 
isolating yourself more and more.’ ” 
  In the ensuing conversation, Nixon states that a good inflation target is 3% and 
reveals his preference for the unemployment rate.     12 
Nixon:  “If we can keep the unemployment, to be perfectly frank with you, John, I’d just 
like to get it down to around 5 … I think to have unemployment around 3 it too low.  The 
labor gets too damned cocky.” 
Shortly thereafter Connally discusses nominal interest rates: 
Connally:  “You don’t want ‘em down until next spring because they’re volatile.  We 
can’t hold the interest rate on short-term Treasuries, in my judgment, down to 3.2 for 
God’s sake…for eighteen months. 
…You can’t hold it to November ’72.  It’s just gonna fluctuate. 
…If you can get [un]employment down to 4%, its not going to stay there. It’ll be going 
back up next year.  Or if you get inflation down…it’s going to go back up next year.  
Nothing stays flat as you well know.” 
Nixon: “It always moves.” 
Connally:  “It always moves.” 
  Since they did not believe that they could hold unemployment and inflation to 
their desired levels, the most important objective was to drive them down just prior to the 
1972 election. 
  Importantly, Connally expresses his concerns abut the international situation and 
the balance of payments deficit.  This issue will prove to be the tipping point that pushes 
Nixon to favor wage and price controls. 
March 18, 1971  (469 – 13)  Nixon, Haldeman and Ehrlichman. 
Nixon [speaking about Connally]:  “That’s the only man that can stand up to Arthur. …  
You tell him what you want, he does it.” 
  Nixon’s admiration for Connally and disdain for Burns are both increasing.   13 
March 19, 1971  (470 – 18)  Nixon and Burns.   
  Burns warns of an impending international monetary crisis and uses  it as an 
argument not to lower interest rates.  Under a fixed exchange rate, the U.S. balance of 
payments deficit has caused losses of official reserves.  Foreign governments that had 
been holding dollar-denominated financial assets have been going to the U.S. gold 
window and demanding gold in exchange for their dollars.  Lowering interest rates 
further would intensify the desire by foreign governments to cash in dollar-denominated 
assets for U.S. gold. 
Burns:  “To drive interest rates lower would run the risk of accelerating an international 
monetary crisis.” 
  Nixon expresses admiration for Connally and instructs Burns to develop a close 
relationship with Connally.  Later, Nixon stresses that monetary policy should be geared 
towards reducing unemployment in 1972. 
Nixon:  “We’ve really got to think of goosing it … late summer and fall of this year 
[1971] and next year.  As you know there’s a hell of a lag.” 
June 8, 1971  (514-8)  Nixon, Shultz and informal economic advisor Milton 
Friedman. 
    Friedman warns against using monetary stimulus to try to reduce nominal interest 
rates or unemployment.  He observes that monetary policy was on the right course 
through January but has become inflationary.  He welcomes an international crisis that 
would necessitate floating the dollar. 
Friedman: “I’m not optimistic because you cannot avoid a rise in interest rates in the next 
six months…I don’t know a thing about politics.  But it does seem to me that nothing   14 
could be more damaging to you in 1972.  …[than] if the price rise in 1972 is back up to 
7%.  I think in general unemployment is much more damaging politically than inflation. 
…but in the particular case of your administration and yourself it is even [tape skips] 
because we took extra measures to do something about it. And now it must pay off.” 
June 14, 1971  (519 – 11)  Shultz, Burns, McCracken and Connally.   
  Shultz and Connally argue that rising nominal rates in the face of a rapid 
monetary expansion reflect strong real demand (income effects).  Burns counters that 
lenders are asking for higher rates due to inflation.   Burns feels inflation is rising and 
suggests energetic action on the wage-price front and a halt to fiscal expansion. 
 Burns:   “You know I care more about unemployment than inflation…” 
Connally:  “I’m more concerned about the inflation than I am unemployment.” 
  Based on previously revealed preferences, these two statements would be more 
credible if reversed. 
Connally:  “I would say some time between now and a year from now you’re going to 
have to impose some kind of a freeze or a wage-price control.” 
  Connally again suggests controls and will ultimately succeed in influencing Nixon 
where Burns cannot.   
June 28, 1971  (531 – 16)  Nixon, Connally and Burns.   
Nixon [to Burns]:  “... the Administration’s signals on economic policy… we’ve got to 
have one spokesman and that is the Secretary of Treasury.   …If we speak with many 
voices, that creates uncertainty….If John [Connally] steps up and (garbled) something 
and then a story comes out from you [Burns] that indicates a different view…there is no 
way we can really cut it…”   15 
  Nixon  has  reaffirmed Connally’s previous message to Burns.  Burns has lost 
influence and is told to toe the line or keep quiet.  Connally is in charge.  Burns later 
argues that he is head of an independent agency, must maintain his credibility and speak 
his mind.  He is clearly unhappy being stifled.   
Nixon: “But I’m not going to go on the wage-price board.  And I’m not going to go on 
the wage-price freeze… I’m not going to say never… I’ve got to indicate, Arthur, now, 
that right now this is what we’re going to do and stick to it….I have to do something with 
regard to foreign imports.” 
  Nixon still opposes any wage and  price  controls at this point,  but  has been 
convinced that the balance of payments problem and gold drain needs attention.   
June 29, 1971  (530- 3)  Nixon, Haldeman, Connally and Ziegler. 
Nixon instructs Ziegler to make the following announcement. 
Nixon:  “The man who is the chief economic spokesman for this administration and 
frankly the President’s chief economic advisor is the Secretary of Treasury.” 
  Connally agrees that Nixon will not create a wage-price board or mandatory 
controls.  Connally is apparently strategically agreeing with Nixon on wage and price 
controls at this point despite his personal view to the contrary. 
July 21, 1971 (541 – 2) Nixon, Haldeman, Connally, Shultz, Ehrlichman and Colson. 
  The group discusses John Kenneth Galbraith and proponents of controls.  Nixon 
remains adamantly opposed. 
Nixon:  “The way wage and price controls is gonna be taken on, I think what has to be 
done, John, is you might put some of your people to work on it is this; you have got to 
create a terrible (garbled) here.  And the way you do it is talk up 50,000 OPA [Office of   16 
Price Administration] cops, you know running around, telling everybody, messing in 
your face and so forth.  Everything is fixed.  You can’t change jobs, you know. 
Rationing!  Just, just, just point it out.  What has happened abroad. …This is a socialist 
scheme, a scheme to socialize America.” 
July 24, 1971  (545 – 2)  Nixon and Connally.   
Nixon:  “The man … that made the bold move on China, you think he’s not going to be 
bold if necessary with regard to this economy?” 
  Nixon is asserting that he will be as bold in tackling domestic economic issues as 
he was on international relations.  Nixon refers to Connally’s program and states that he 
wants to emphasize “making America competitive again.”
7 
July 24, 1971  (545 – 3)  Nixon, Ehrlichman and Haldeman.  
  Nixon wants a story leaked through Colson about a recommendation to expand 
the Federal Reserve Board.  Nixon also wants a second rumor to be leaked.  
Nixon:  “In view of the fact that the President has responsibility for full employment, the 
President is considering legislation to … the Fed has got to be brought in the …” 
Haldeman: “in the executive branch.” 
Nixon: “The independence of the Fed…” 
Haldeman: “is seriously in question.” 
  Nixon and Haldeman discuss two pending vacancies on the Federal Reserve 
Board. 
Nixon:  “We’re going to fill ’em both with basically easy money men.” 
                                                 
7 Taping began while this conversation was already in progress.  Connally’s presentation of his “program” 
is lost, although it is likely similar or identical to the program he discusses at length on August 2, 553-6.   17 
Haldeman:  “George (Shultz) said both he and Connally are under orders from you to 
find the easiest money man in town.” 
  Nixon is now conspiring to do an end-run around Burns to get the expansionary 
monetary policy he desires. 
July 26, 1971  (546  – 2 ) Nixon and  Assistant to the President for International 
Economic Affairs Peter Peterson.  
  Peterson discusses the deterioration in the balance of payments and the high rate 
of unemployment.  He asks for authority to work in top secret on a bold approach with an 
August announcement.  Nixon recommends speaking to Connally and Peterson replies 
that he and Connally have discussed his ideas. 
Nixon:  “I’ve never seen anybody beaten on inflation in the United States.  I’ve seen 
many people beaten on unemployment.” 
  Friedman’s earlier advice about the political costs of reviving inflation has had no 
impact on Nixon whose primary concern is reducing unemployment.  When Nixon took 
office the unemployment rate was 3.3%.  After efforts to reduce inflation resulted in a 
recession in 1970, unemployment rose to 6% and stubbornly remained there.  As stated 
above, Nixon preferred a 5% rate. 
July 27, 1971  (547 – 9)  Nixon, Connally and Peterson  
  Nixon asks Connally to discuss his program with Peterson.  Nixon wants to limit 
planning to the three of them, plus Shultz and McCracken.  Paul  Volcker, then Under-
Secretary of the Treasury for international monetary affairs, is added to the planning 
group at some point, but Burns is kept out.  Connally discusses his international concerns.  
Later,   18 
Connally:  “There is a risk in imposing wage and price controls.  No question about it.  
But there’s a risk if you don’t.” 
  The tapes indicate that Connally always supported a wage-price policy, but never 
supported them publicly as Burns had.  Thus, it was Connally who was finally able to 
convince Nixon to impose a freeze, not Burns who was excluded from the planning. 
  Later, Nixon discusses the Fed vacancy. 
Nixon:  “I want him  [the new member to the Fed’s Board] to be a guy that’s more 
interested in the job front than the inflation front.” 
August 2, 1971  (553 – 6)  Nixon and Shultz joined by Connally.   
  Nixon begins with criticisms of Burns and then turns to discussing industries with 
high wage-price push. 
Nixon:  “It seems to me that on a rifle-shot basis, symbolic, you could get in and do 
those, and then basically then you do have an incomes policy.  …. Just do some stuff for 
symbolism?” 
  Nixon wants the public to think he is doing something about inflation, but his 
only real concern is unemployment, so a symbolic action against inflation is enough. 
Connally lays out his plan for closing the gold window (the institutional arrangement 
where foreign governments are permitted to convert dollars into gold at a fixed rate), 
floating the dollar exchange rate, placing limits on Federal spending, imposing a 10% 
tariff, a 7% investment tax credit, a cut of the excise tax on oil and a 90-120 day freeze 
on wages and prices. 
  Connally then appeals to Nixon’s leadership desires.   19 
Connally:  “It ought to show the people that you have both an awareness of the problems 
that (garbled) in both the domestic and international field and show secondly and most 
importantly that you have the courage to face up to it.  That you take a position before 
you’re forced to take a position.” 
  Nixon has doubts about the plan which they discuss.  Connally reports that 
Peterson supports the plan as does McCracken.  The plan apparently is not fully 
supported by Shultz who is present and by Burns who is not present. 
8  
  Connally wants to keep meetings secret from Burns (a major source of leaks, they 
believe).  They discuss timing.  Connally wants to act sooner and Nixon later.  Connally’s 
concern is an impending run on U.S. gold reserves.   
Nixon:  “We must not talk to him [Burns] until we’ve decided we’re going to do it, 
because he will talk.”   
Connally:  “I know it.” 
August 2, 1971  (268 – 5) Nixon and Haldeman, later joined by Connally and Shultz.   
Nixon:  “Well, we’ll have to look at this thing [Connally’s plan]….” 
Haldeman: “Does Connally have the input on wage-price controls?....” 
Nixon: “Oh hell yes.  They’re the ones that are pushing it, Volcker, you know…” 
  After Connally enters, Connally argues that an international crisis or moment of 
truth is coming.  He states that a wage-price freeze will prevent inflation from the plan’s 
proposed tariff.  Nixon is reluctant to close the gold window, afraid that this would be 
perceived as a failure of his Presidency.  Connally, Shultz and Nixon continue to discuss 
the proposed freeze, devaluation or floating and the tariff.   
                                                 
8 There is no discussion of the nature of Shultz’s and Burns’ opposition in this conversation.  In other 
conversations Shultz (553-6) is said to oppose the freeze, tariffs and suspension of the gold standard and 
Burns (273-30) the suspension of the gold standard and the tariffs (273-26).   20 
  When discussing the need to break the cycle of wage inflation, Connally makes 
the following interesting statement:  “If you do all those things and you don’t do 
something like this [wage and price freeze], then it seems to me you could really, 
throwing gas on the fire.”   
  Connally knew his plan would stimulate the economy and that wage and price 
controls were the only way to keep inflation from increasing.  He went on to argue that a 
psychological break was needed, and a freeze would provide it. 
  This August 2 meeting appears to be the key meeting that launched the NEP.  
Haldeman notes in his diary (1994, pp. 335-6) that [The President] “had a long session 
with Connally.  The net of this is a huge economic breakthrough based on the 
international monetary situation…” and  “[this breakthrough]  becomes a rather 
momentous decision, and it will be interesting to see what develops.” 
  All the tapes this day discuss Connally’s plan.  Nixon, the man who only a few 
days earlier said that wage and price controls would cause a “terrible smothering of the 
free economy” and were “a scheme to socialize America” is now prepared to impose a 
wage and price freeze as part of a bold plan to tackle domestic and international problems 
facing the economy. 
August 4, 1971  (554 – 7)  Nixon, Connally and Shultz.   
  Connally reports that Burns fears that Treasury is moving to take over the Fed. 
Connally told Burns it was not his goal.  Nixon firmly supports the Connally plan for the 
New Economic Policy.  Now the remaining decision is timing.  Nixon claims that “..the 
best time to do it is the day after Congress gets back.” 
  Labor Day was September 6 and Congress was in recess through September 8.   21 
Looking forward, Shultz tells Nixon that something will be needed following the freeze.   
August 12, 1971  (7 – 112)  Nixon and Connally in a telephone conversation.  
  Connally states that he expects another bad day at the gold window and that we 
are “constantly losing the initiative”.  The reference is to the drain of gold from official 
reserves due to the conversion of dollars into gold.
9  The initiative that is being lost refers 
to the plan to close the gold window.  He and Nixon discuss how to calm the international 
situation. They refer to the domestic part (freeze on wages and prices and import tariffs) 
and international part (closing the gold window and floating the dollar).  They discuss the 
options of accelerating both or just one part and speculate as to what would do the most 
to calm the international situation. 
Nixon:  “I know that the cleaner way to do it is to do it all in one bundle, uh, et cetera.  
But, uh, if we’re going to have to move our timetable up and uh try to explain all this 
thing you know, that’s a hell of a hard thing to explain to people.” 
  Nixon is leaning toward doing the domestic part first, and Connally agrees, but 
this may just be a strategic decision on Connally’s part to agree with the President.
  
August 12, 1971  (273-20)  Nixon, Connally and Shultz. 
  In spite of Connally’s urging earlier that day to accelerate the program due to an 
impending international crisis, Nixon expresses his desire to call Congressional leaders 
back on September 7 and announce the program then.  Connally agrees that waiting until 
September 7 is the wise thing to do but they cannot wait because they have lost over $3.6 
billion of reserves during the first twelve days of August.
 10 
                                                 
9 Haldeman (1994, p. 340) records that “…the British had asked for $3 billion to be converted into gold.  If 
we gave it to them, other countries might follow suit.  If we didn’t, they might wonder if we had enough 
gold to support the dollar.  In either case, it was a major crisis.” 
10 Connally anticipates that Monday (August 16) was going to be a very bad day.     22 
  Later, Connally predicts that closing the gold window will not be the main focus 
of public attention. 
Connally:  “To the average person in this country this wage and price freeze – to him 
means you mean business.  You’re gonna stop this inflation.  You’re gonna try to get 
control of this economy.   …If you take all of these actions…you’re not going to have 
anybody…left out to be critical of you.”
11   
  A few minutes later Nixon agrees to accelerate the program. 
Nixon:  “I think we ought to go Monday [August 16, 1971] with the whole ball.” 
  Later in the meeting Shultz suggests moving to Sunday night.  This possibility is 
discussed briefly, but no change is made at this time.
12 
August 13, 1971  (563-6)  Nixon and Haldeman. 
  Haldeman writes (1994, p. 340) that “As a result of last night’s decision on the 
economic move…” a meeting was scheduled beginning that afternoon with the President, 
the Quadriad and other economic and political advisors at Camp David.
13   
The tapes reveal concern about leaks from Peterson and especially Burns. 
Haldeman asks Nixon if he intends to keep everyone “up there” and away from 
Washington until Monday.  They discuss possible times to request TV time for the 
President’s speech.  It is clear that on Friday afternoon the announcement was still 
planned for Monday night. 
                                                 
11 Regardless of his economic knowledge, Connally’s political skills are impressive. 
12 Unfortunately, the tape quality is particularly poor at this point and the conversation becomes 
unintelligible. 
13 During conversation 273-20 (above) Connally recommends not revealing at the Camp David meeting 
that a decision has been made and conduct the meeting in a way that everyone feels that they are part of the 
decision.   23 
  Taping equipment was not installed at Camp David until May 1972, so the 
conversations were not recorded.  However, Haldeman’s diaries (1994, pp. 340-346) 
record the gist of the proceedings.  The Camp David meetings began Friday late 
afternoon.  The key sticking point was closing the gold window, which Connally and 
Volcker supported and Burns strenuously opposed.  Although the decision was ostensibly 
made, Haldeman writes that Nixon vacillated on this point and did not finally decide to 
close the gold window until Saturday, August 14.  There is no indication of when it was 
decided to move the announcement forward from Monday to Sunday, August 15.  
August 15, 1971 (7 – 122)  Nixon and Connally in a telephone conversation following 
Nixon’s address to the nation.   
Connally tells Nixon that he had watched all three channels and CBS had done a great 
job.  Connally quoted the CBS correspondent: “This is the domestic visit to Peking.” 
  Nixon is now being applauded for both his domestic and international initiatives. 
September 11, 1971   (7 – 122)  Nixon, Burns and Connally. Less than one month 
into the 90-day wage and price freeze.   
  Planning for the post-freeze period is a major topic.  Burns voices his opinion that 
the freeze of Phase I should be followed by a thaw—a gradual transition to restoring free-
market pricing.    Burns also indicates “we’ve got to have some sanctions” in Phase II.    
Nixon says “I think the thaw idea is quite intriguing.”  Regardless of what will follow 
Phase I, Nixon notes that the Administration must “give the idea that we have a plan, that 
we know what we are doing,” and that “we know what we’re doing and we’re going to do 
it.” 
September 20, 1971  (577-3)  Nixon and Burns.   
   24 
Burns:  “If you pass an unfirm (?)  freeze, the restoration of [pricing] freedom, you’ll lose 
the people.  You’ve got to do it gradually.” 
Nixon:  “Don’t worry.  [garbled]  As a matter of fact, I’d like the freeze on right through 
the election.” 
  The men acknowledge that the freeze has been very popular with the pubic and 
going back to free-market pricing could prove politically damaging.  Nixon indicates that 
labor needs to be restrained in their wage demands, “They [unions] play too rough.” 
Nixon, once adamantly opposed to price controls, is now, perhaps half jokingly, ready to 
freeze prices until the election.  This sets the stage for a continuation of wage and price 
controls under Phase II. 
September 24, 1971  (578-4) Nixon, George Shultz and Milton Friedman.  The 90-
day wage and price freeze has been in effect for over five weeks.   
Friedman:  “Now on the domestic side, there are two questions or problems.  One is the 
technical problem of how you unwind the price control.  [garbled]  But I think there is a 
more fundamental or basic problem.  The great danger lies in the path we are now on, is 
that, under cover of suppressing the inflation, the true inflationary forces will be 
increased.  That’s the real danger.  Because the Congressman says, ‘Why do we have to 
worry about inflation?  Here’s the CLC [Cost of Living Council], they’re taking care of it 
for us.’  Now that’s a very real danger, because we want to look forward…” 
Nixon:  “They’ll spend more.” 
Friedman:  “They’ll spend more.  The same danger with the Fed.  When it sat down, it 
could print more.  Now from your point of view and our point of view, we want to look 
forward, not only to ’72, but beyond that.  We don’t want, we all want a victory in ’72,   25 
but we don’t want a victory which has to be followed by a course of action that puts the 
Democrats in power for 20 years.”  
Nixon:  “Yeah.” 
Friedman:  “[garbled]… If you let the inflationary pressure build up over us, we might be 
able to hold it down at least through the election [in 1972].   [Garbled]   After this, you’ll 
have a great upsurge in inflation.  And there would be again pressure to stepping on the 
brakes, hard again.  We will have thrown away the advantage, what we gained with the 
cost of the 1970 recession.  You’ll have to have an even worse recession.  And, if in 
1974, your fortune is to superintend a severe recession, that’s going to put the Democrats 
back in for 20 years.  Now that’s a horror story and I don’t mean to say it’s [garbled].  It’s 
possible.  Now the question is how to avoid it.  And the key to avoiding it is our friend 
Arthur [Burns], as I was telling you last night.”  
Nixon:  “Uh, huh.” 
Friedman:  “Because Congress will not be able to, I think, prevent from spending and 
we’ll have a whopping [garbled] deficit.  And if the Fed monetizes that deficit and 
increases the quantity of money at anything like the way it did in the first six months of 
this year, I’m afraid that the scenario I’ve described is inevitable.” 
Nixon:  “Well, let’s just hope we don’t convince Arthur to do it too soon.”  (Friedman 
laughs).   
Nixon is worried that a tight monetary policy applied “too soon” would adversely 
affect the employment picture prior to the election.  Shultz and Nixon express concern 
that the Fed had engaged in monetary “contraction” in the previous month.  Friedman 
asserts that the month-to-month money supply numbers are not very meaningful and   26 
assures them that a robust economic recovery is underway.  Friedman predicts that 
unemployment will not be a problem for the 1972 election and restates that the real 
problem is to keep the money supply growth in the 4-5 percent range so that inflationary 
pressures will not build up. 
Later in this conversation, Friedman indicates that he opposes any quantitative 
numbers as guidelines for wage and price increases following the 90-day freeze of Phase 
I.  He suggests that the Wage and Price Review Board be given power to delay wage and 
price increases for 60 or 90 days.  This would, he said, produce “a cosmetic influence on 
the price index which is what you really want.” 
George Shultz reports that Arthur Burns advocates a specific guideline of 4 
percent for wage increases during Phase II.  The men discuss various problems associated 
with managing wages and prices and especially the problem that would likely arise with 
the labor unions that already have higher-than-guideline wage increases on their 
bargaining tables.  Friedman offers a solution:  Appoint Arthur Burns to head the Wage 
and Price Review Board.  After a few seconds of awkward silence, Friedman says:  “This 
would be poetic justice.  He’s the person that is most responsible for building this box.  
He should be chairman of the Board for getting us out.”  [The men now get the joke and 
laughter ensues] 
While Burns had been the most public supporter of the wage and price controls, it 
was actually Connally who had built and sold the box to Nixon. 
October 5, 1971  (584-3)   Nixon, Connally, Shultz, McCracken and Stein meet to 
discuss the proposed plan for Phase II.     27 
The President is in possession of a memorandum from Connally, Shultz, 
McCracken and Stein for their Phase II proposal.   Connally informs the President that 
prior to reaching their decision that everyone was given an opportunity to speak their 
minds.  If there was no consensus, the group planned to take a formal vote, but this was 
apparently not needed.  The four men had all agreed that once the President decided on a 
policy for Phase II the President’s decision would “bind us all.” 
  The proposed goal of bringing inflation down to 2 to 3 percent by the end of 1972 
is discussed.  Nixon, who previously acknowledged that price and wage controls would 
not work, worries about the consequences of failing to meet the goal.  Connally craftily 
tells Nixon that the onus of achieving the goal of 2-3 percent will not be on the President, 
but rather on the Pay Board.  If the goal is not met, the President can “take them on” and 
“set new standards.” 
  The President worries about the unions and wage contracts that had previously 
been agreed to, but were deferred as a result of the wage and price freeze.  He fears labor 
will strike if these contracts are not honored.  Connally suggests that these deferred 
increases in wages be permitted and taken as a “lump.”  These would be permitted before 
the end of 1971 and wouldn’t go into the statistical computations for 1972.  
Consequently, Nixon is told, the wage increases wouldn’t adversely affect achieving the 
goal of 2-3 percent inflation by the end of 1972.  The President is also told by Connally 
that the wording of the goal is to achieve an inflation rate of 2-3 percent by the end of 
1972.  The election at the beginning of November gives the President “a little bit of 
running room” because there will still be 60 days to go before assessing whether or not   28 
the goal was achieved.  Thus, Phase II was constructed so that the President would be 
blameless if the wage and price controls failed to achieve their goal. 
October 7, 1971  (10-121)  Nixon and Burns on the White House telephone.  Nixon 
will address the nation that evening and announce the plan for Phase II.   
Nixon:  “Hi, Arthur.” 
Burns:  “Good morning, Mr. President.” 
Nixon:  “You were in New York yesterday so I didn’t get a chance to talk to you.  But I 
wonder if (senior White House speechwriter) Bill [Safire] has talked to you yet?” 
Burns:  “Yes, he has.” 
Nixon:  “Great, Great.” 
Burns:  “And I’ve made a few minor changes in language.” 
Nixon: “ I wanted you to check the language.” 
  Burns congratulates Nixon on reaching a quick decision on Phase II and voices 
his strong support. 
Nixon:  “As you know, they did bend to your wishes on setting the target of 2 to 3 
[percent per year for output prices].” 
Later in the conversation, 
Nixon:  “As a safeguard, I will ask the Congress [for standby controls on interest rates].  
Now, that doesn’t bother ya?” 
Burns: “ No, no.  Mr. President, I don’t think you have much of a choice.” 
  The two men discuss the likelihood that Congress would insist on some interest 
rate controls to go along with wage and price controls.   29 
Nixon:  “Even John McClellan came in to see me, Arthur, very Conservative and running 
this year and he said, ‘You got to do something about interest.’” 
Burns:  “Well, that’s it.” 
Nixon:  “Well, I said…the gobbly gook that we’re doing something.  ‘Well, no, the 
people don’t think so.’  Well, let’s say it [that we’re doing something] and hope to God 
they [interest rates] go down.” 
Burns: “ I know it.  Well, I was with bankers yesterday, New York bankers, and I told 
them that we’d probably will have to go that way [interest rate controls].  But, we’ll try to 
keep it on a voluntary basis and a lot will depend on them.” 
Nixon:  “And also they’ll trust you.  But on the other hand, Arthur, if you get on the 
phone to call somebody, it’s gonna have more impact than anybody else in this country.  
So you just do it.  OK?” 
Burns:  “Well, I’m going to help as much as I can.  This is terribly complex.” 
Nixon:   “ I appreciate it.  And I’m going to slug it to them on the high level tonight 
[Nixon’s public announcement of Phase II] and you do it at the low level, you know.  But 
if you need to, kick ‘em in the groin.  [Nixon chuckles].” 
Burns:  “Mr. President, I haven’t read your speech but I hope, I hope, the rhetoric is 
strong.” 
Nixon:  “Don’t worry, it’s very strong [Nixon laughs].  Probably too strong, but it’s 
strong.  It just basically says we are going to continue.  ...I’m not calling it a new program 
but I’m calling it a continuation of the old.” 
Burns:  “Well now, that’s the right emphasis.”   30 
Nixon:  “See, now, basically it is new, but I say we are going to continue the program of 
wage [garbled].  That was the key thing I thought had to be in there.  Remember you 
recommended that and I put it in.”  
Burns:  “Right.” 
Nixon:  “But I’ve got some lines in there that you’ll like.” 
Burns:  “Well, wonderful.  [pause] Now we’re getting some good economic news.” 
Nixon:  “Wholesale prices is good.” 
Burns:  “Wholesale price index.  Have you seen the unemployment figure?” 
Nixon:   “I understand a little down.” 
Burns:  “Just a little.  Not enough, but…” 
Nixon:   “At least it didn’t go up.”  [Burns laughs]. 
Burns:   “Good luck tonight.” 
Nixon:  “Thank you.” [End of conversation] 
  Nixon does his best to make Burns feel that he is part of the team by pointing to 
the adoption of the inflation goal that Burns favored and by giving Burns the opportunity 
to fine tune the President’s public announcements.  Tactically, Nixon needs Burns on his 
side in order to keep monetary policy expansionary.  Both men would like interest rates 
to fall, but ironically, their expansionary monetary policy would eventually do just the 
reverse by raising inflationary expectations.  Had an investor or banker trusted Arthur 
Burns and invested in a 10-year Treasury bond on this date, she or he would have lost   31 
over 22% percent of the investment in real terms over the life of the bond due to the 
forthcoming unexpected inflation that made the real interest rate on the bond negative.
14   
October 29  (607-11)  Nixon and Arthur Burns.  Fifteen days before the initiation of 
Phase II.   
  Nixon and Burns discuss the problem with getting the labor unions to go along 
with the wage and price control program and strategize an appropriate response. 
Nixon:  “I’m having one hell of a time with this son of a bitch [George] Meany…” 
Burns:   “Now this is the problem.” 
Nixon:  “You have to play cards.” 
Burns:   “You have to play cards.” 
Nixon:  “[garbled] Suppose he walks out?” 
Burns:   “All right, all right.” 
Nixon:  “What would you do?” 
Burns:   “Well, well, the…” 
Nixon:   “Fight?” 
Burns:  “No, then, then, the, you go before the country and you indicate that you will 
now… [garbled].” 
Nixon:   “Freeze ‘em again?” 
Burns:  “That, no, not yet, not yet, but you establish strength in spite of this, if restraint 
[garble], you put on a freeze [garbled].” 
Nixon:  “[garbled] as late, close to the election as possible.” 
                                                 
14 At that time the yield on new medium -term Treasury bonds was about 6.1%.  The average rate of 
inflation between October 1971 and October 1981 was 8.6%.  Thus, the ex post pre-tax, real return was 
approximately -2.5%.  The continuously compounded return is e
-rt, where r is -.025 and t is 10 years.   32 
Burns:   “Yeah.  And the blame will be, I think, Mr. President, that the country is sick and 
tired of arrogance.” 
Nixon:  “Oh, I agree.” 
  Nixon’s wage and price freeze was politically popular and he sees another 
opportunity to demonstrate his strong leadership by re-imposing a freeze close to the 
election if the unions fail to play cards.  As time would prove, the country indeed would 
become sick and tired of the arrogance of power, but not so much against George Meany 
and the AFL-CIO.    
December 22, 1971  (640-3)  Nixon and Shultz.  The men are later joined by Burns.  
Five weeks into Phase II.   
  Shultz discusses a recent conversation that he has had with Arthur Burns who is 
not present.  Burns, Shultz tells the President, is upset about the recent nominee to the 
Federal Reserve Board.  Burns’ favorite nominee was passed over in favor of the number 
three candidate.  Nixon explains his decision to Shultz and adds: 
Nixon:  “…I would not put someone on the Board that he [Burns] was totally against.  I 
would not do that because I would not want to harm our money’s worth—that he [Burns] 
can’t control [the last phrase given in a near whisper].” 
  Later, 
Nixon:  “Now what about the money supply?” 
Shultz:  “He [Burns] agrees that the money supply should now go up.” 
Nixon:  “ Is he going to do it?” 
  Shortly after, Burns enters the room.  After exchanging pleasantries, Burns 
eventually says “I’ve got Federal Reserve problems” and discusses his disappointment in   33 
the new nominee to the Board and details his concern that John Connally’s views 
influenced the decision.  Nixon details the decision process, which involved various 
political considerations (nowhere mentioning an “easy money” man, however), and 
assures Burns that “your views will receive primary weight” and that Nixon would never 
appoint someone Burns vetoes.  Nixon says that as a rule he never considers candidates 
that an agency or department head vetoes.  He offers Burns a confidential story about a 
Supreme Court nominee. 
Nixon:  “Between you and me, he [Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger] was the 
one mildly opposed to a woman.  He [Burger] said, ‘Look, you can’t sit nine people 
around and have a woman there.’
15  Now maybe that’s going to change someday, but 
maybe... [garbled].”  
  Nixon once again makes Burns feel important and offered him a rather 
controversial insider story about Burger.  After the men finish the discussion about the 
appointment process, the meeting seems to be wrapping up when, 
Nixon:  “[garbled]…I’m not going to raise this point, but these people have asked me 
about the money supply.  Burns can take care of it.  Correct? [garbled]” 
Burns:  “Burns is on the line.” 
Nixon:  “Arthur, [garbled].  You’re independent! [Burns laughs]. Independent!  You get 
it up.  I don’t want any more nasty letters from people about it.  OK?” 
Burns:  “That [no more nasty letters], I can’t guarantee.” 
  Later, 
                                                 
15 This story was relayed to Nixon by Attorney General John Mitchell.  Nixon also reveals that he did not 
think it appropriate for him to speak directly to Supreme Court justices as he did to Burns.   34 
Nixon:  “The whole point is, get it up [the money supply].  You know, fair enough?  Kick 
it!”
16 
  Three months prior to this conversation, Milton Friedman warned Nixon [Conv. 
No. 578-4 above] about wage and price controls and the temptation they would provide 
for engaging in expansionary fiscal and monetary policies under the illusion of price 
stability.  Burns is now “on the line” and “playing cards.”  Burns and Nixon are now 
doing precisely what Friedman warned against.   
  After Burns leaves the room, Nixon disparages Burns to Shultz by calling him a 
“little man” in his complaining about the Board appointee and particularly about Burns’ 
concern that John Connally played a role in sabotaging Burns’ pick for the Board.  
Elsewhere in the conversation, Shultz and Nixon discuss the latest inflation statistics. 
Over the previous twelve months, the inflation rate was 3.5 percent.  Shultz points out 
that the year-to-year number will fall going forward (as wage and price controls were 
now in place).  Nixon and Shultz discuss problems with the operations of the Cost of 
Living Council and the Price Commission.  Nixon firmly claims:  “I am totally 
committed to getting rid of both of them.”  Obviously, he was referring to some time after 
the election.   
  Nixon and Shultz also discuss a letter from Milton Friedman that apparently took 
aim on the Fed’s already expansionary monetary policy.  They are concerned that this 
might influence Burns to retract his promise to further increase the growth rate for the 
money supply.  With Phase II set to operate through to the election, Nixon now focuses 
                                                 
16 Burns, in fact, succeeded in getting the Open Market Committee to agree to a more expansionary 
monetary policy (Abrams, 2006).   35 
his attention on keeping Burns to his word about delivering on the money supply 
(Abrams, 2006).   
Concluding Remarks. 
  The Nixon tapes clearly indicate that Nixon cared little about inflation and was 
most concerned about unemployment:  “I’ve never seen anybody beaten on inflation in 
the United States.  I’ve seen many people beaten on unemployment.”  Wage and price 
controls, in his words, would produce at best a “cosmetic” effect and at worst “a terrible 
smothering to enter on this whole free economy of ours.”   Yet, on August 15, 1971, 
Richard Nixon announced a 90-day freeze on wages and prices that would get the federal 
government involved in controls for years. 
  John Connally proved to be the key player in devising Nixon’s New Economic 
Policy and especially in convincing Nixon that wage and price controls were needed in 
order to demonstrate Nixon’s bold leadership in tackling the inflation problem facing the 
nation.  Connally clearly allied himself with Nixon in pressuring Arthur Burns “to pump 
it up.”   Nixon was prepared to “take on the Fed” and destroy its independence if need be 
to achieve the expansionary monetary policy he desired.  The resulting monetary policy 
and expansionary fiscal policies contained in NEP did indeed throw “gasoline on the 
fire.” 
  Milton Friedman played the role of Cassandra.  He foretold of the dangers of 
wage and price controls, but his sage advice went unheeded and the political and 
economic drama unfolded just as he predicted.   Arthur Burns, playing the tragic hero, 
detailed the arguments against adopting a more expansionary monetary policy, but under   36 
pressure of being the odd man out and seeing the independence of the Fed threatened, 
played cards.   
  It is said that just because you’re paranoid, it doesn’t mean they aren’t out to get 
you.  Similarly, just because you have inflationary expectations it doesn’t mean they 
aren’t rational.  Given the inflationary policies of the Nixon Administration, “s.o.b.” 
George Meany and the AFL-CIO seem to be the ones with rational expectations.  Nixon 
noted that labor gets “too cocky” at an unemployment rate around 3 percent.  Given that 
the unemployment rate hovered near 6 percent, wage-push inflation was not an issue, at 
least in Nixon’s mind.  The hypothesis that wage and price controls were imposed to 
break unwarranted inflationary expectations receives little support in the Nixon tapes 
reviewed here.  Rather, wage and price controls were born out of political expediency and 
persisted due to their political popularity. 
  While Nixon was initially reluctant to accept the wage and price freeze, he soon 
turned into an enthusiastic supporter:  “As a matter of fact, I’d like the freeze on right 
through the election.”  He worried that Phase II’s goal of a 2-3 percent inflation rate by 
the end of 1972 would not be achieved, but the design for the program was such that 
Nixon could plausibly deny responsibility for any failure.   However inefficacious Nixon 
thought wage and price controls would be, they satisfied his political imperative to “give 
the idea that we have a plan, that we know what we are doing…and we’re going to do it.” 
The following excerpt from a personal email received from Milton Friedman on 
September 25, 2006, offers his insights into Nixon’s wage and price controls: 
…Nixon worked in the Office of Price Administration during World War II and 
got a very negative opinion of price and wage control so in principle he was strongly 
opposed to wage and price controls.  But as we all know, Nixon had the capacity of rising 
above principle if politics demanded it.   37 
My explanation of why he adopted price and wage controls… hinges on the crisis 
in foreign payments and the gold market that developed in the summer of 1971….The 
obvious solution was to close the gold window, that is to say, to end the agreement by the 
United States to provide gold on demand at the fixed official price.  However, if the 
President did nothing else but simply close the gold window, he foresaw that he would 
get all sorts of negative publicity; he would be called the negative President; he shuts 
down; he doesn’t open up, etc.  So he yielded to the suggestions of John Connolly [sic] 
that he offer a major program of stopping inflation of which one part would be closing 
the gold window and another part would be the imposition of price and wage control.  
Connolly argued that he could sell that proposal as a far-reaching imaginative proposal 
instead of as a simple negative reaction to pressure from outside. 
In short, had there been no gold crisis, I believe there would not have been price 
and wage control on August 15, 1971. …I met with Nixon only once after August 15, 
1971.  On that occasion he emphasized his own distaste for wage and price control and 
assured me that they would get rid of them. 
 
The tapes support Friedman’s interpretation.  Treasury Secretary John Connally 
faced an impending crisis resulting from balance of payments deficits and loss of gold 
reserves.  He persuaded a reluctant President to suspend gold convertibility by combining 
the suspension of convertibility and floating of the exchange rate with a package of 
policies intended to stimulate the domestic economy and hopefully reduce the stubborn 
rate of unemployment.  Connally correctly foresaw that the public would pay far greater 
attention to the domestic changes, especially Nixon’s bold approach to fighting inflation 
by imposing wage and price controls, than to the international changes. 
Richard Nixon arguably remains most remembered for the infamous Watergate 
burglary and subsequent cover-up that led to his resignation, but his manipulation of 
macroeconomic policy in the run-up to the 1972 election proved far more damaging to 
the nation.  The recessions that were needed to break the Nixon-induced inflation cost the 
country hundreds of billions of dollars, redistributed enormous amounts of wealth from 
creditors to debtors and raised the risk premium in financial markets for years to come.    38 
Surely, the costs to the nation of the Watergate burglary and subsequent cover-up were 
minor in comparison.   39 
Table 1 
Unemployment and Inflation rates 
______________________________________________________________ 
Date         Unemployment           Inflation Rate 
                         Rate                    (previous 12 months) 
 
7-1-69   3.5%      5.4% 
1-1-70    3.9%      6.2% 
7-1-70   5.0%      5.7% 
1-1-71   5.9%      5.3% 
7-1-71   6.0%      4.4% 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Source:  St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank website at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ 
and authors’ calculations.  The inflation rate is based on the seasonally adjusted CPI for 
urban consumers and for all items; the unemployment rate is for the civilian labor force. 
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